AF447 – assim como outros o avião também desviou para oeste … 2009/07/13Posted by gsavix in Memorando.
Tags: acidente aéreo, acompanhe entendendo, airbus a330, BEA, entenda o que aconteceu e o que está acontecendo, oraro, tasil, voo air france af447
AF447 Air France assim como o Lufthansa, o avião também desviou para oeste da aerovia conforme demonstram os cálculos:
Na página 71 do seu relatório, a BEA apresenta uma lista chamada de “fatos estabelecidos”. A semântica é usada com o propósito: o(s) significado(s) das sentenças toma maior proporção e importância de acordo com a ordenação dada. É verdade que a BEA teve um mês para pensar sobre isto cuidadosamente …
Aqui está a demonstração das análises e dos cálculos: Até o último ponto do relatório automático recebido às 2 h 10 min 34, o voo estava na rota planejada”.
Significado: AF447 não efetuou nenhum desvio de rota.
* “O tempo era consistente com o que é normalmente encontrado em Junho na zona de convergêngia inter-tropical.”
Significado : sempre há tempestades nesta área.
* “Existe um potente cluster de nuvens cumulonimbus na trajetória do voo AF447. Muitas destas nuvens podem provocar turbulência”.
Significado : existem fortes tempestades na trajetória do voo AF447 as quais serão devidamente contornadas.
* “Muitas aeronaves que fizeram este trajeto antes e depois do AF447, na mesma altitude, alteraram seu curso para evitar as nuvens “.
Significado: as outras aeronaves que voaram na mesma rota, e que não se acidentaram, alteraram seu curso para evitar as significativas tempestades.
em resumo: todas as aeronaves que alteraram seu caminho sobreviveram, e o AF 447, o qual permaneceu na rota planejada se acidentou.
Por acaso alguém tem alguma idéia de quem são os responsáveis por não alterarem a trajeto da aeronave para contornar a tempestade?
Se você não tem, porque é complicado, o CEO da Air France Pierre-Henri Gourgeon ajudou com suas afirmações para o jornal Le Figaro no dia 8 de Julho de 2009: “O Comandante do voo Sao Paulo – Paris passou um pouco após o voo AF 447 na área, e disse que eles voaram na área que não está mapeada pelo radar, e manualmente mapearam a tempestade com o radar, e por causa disso desviaram da tempestade. AF447 pode não ter sido avisado antecipadamente e por isso não conseguiu desviar de uma área de intensas trovoadas. Esse testemunho irá motivar a todos nós a reconsiderar como utilizar o radar. As condições meteorológicas ou não podem ser a causa do desaparecimento do AF447, nós precisamos considerar todos os fatores, regras e procedimentos e acontecimentos que aconteceram.”
… tradução vai continuar…
Meaning : the pilots of AF447 did not use their radar and were not lucky enough not to get killed. Air France will train its dummy pilots to finally be able to use the radar. As for the statement “whether or not this is the cause of the disappearance of flight AF447, we must consider all factors and evolutionary processes and rules», it must be underlined that these words surprisingly do not apply when it comes to the Pitot probes… Because Pitot probes are not, can not be, and are prohibited from being the cause of AF447 crash.
This is it, the case is solved, the aircraft crashed because the BEA and Air France say with one voice the aircraft remained on the flight plan route and flew straight in the “big huge storms” described by Mr. Feldzer.
But is this only true?
Is this really a “fact” as alleged by the BEA?
On page 13 the BEA report, there is a map showing the sequence of ACARS automatic position reports sent every 10 minutes, as confirmed page 25.
At 2:00 am UTC, the aircraft is located before ORARO waypoint. At 2:10 UTC, the aircraft is located after “ORARO” and before “TASIL”.
On page 69 of the BEA report, we are given the case of Lufthansa flight 507, which preceded AF447 by twenty minutes on the same flight level and on the same airway. The Lufthansa flight has diverted its path “of a dozen miles to the west” to avoid an area with radar echoes in the region of ORARO. Meaning the Lufthansa Boeing 747 was using his radar, and therefore survived. He survived only by deviating 10 Nm to the west in the region ORARO…
So what did the flight AF447, “twenty minutes” later in this same region ORARO, between 2:00 and 2:10 UTC?
According to the BEA, “the flight took place on the flight planned route.”
But to be able to say this, the BEA would need two things:
* a continuous position report of the aircraft, and not just position reports every 10 minutes.
* it is true the aircraft remained on its flight planned route.
Because by watching someone once every 10 minutes, you can’t tell where that person is during the 9 other minutes. During each interval of 9 minutes the aircraft position is unknown…
There is no evidence, therefore, AF447 did not altered its path near ORARO (between 2:00 and 2h10) as flight LH507 did.
On the contrary, there are evidences that AF447 has deviated from its planned route!
Page 48 of the BEA report, it says “the last position received” at 2:10 UTC is 2.98° (2° 58.8′) North and 30.59° (030°35.4′) West.
On a map, it is easy to find the “flight plan route” between “ORARO and TASIL.
Between these two points, the course is similar to the great circle route (corresponding to the curved line between those two points on the earth sphere). Indeed, the distance between these two points being only 119Nm the lateral deviation is negligible.
The report of the position of AF447 at 2:10 UTC, provided by the BEA, place the aircraft at about 2.9 nm West of the airway.
For the curious, an official Jeppesen electronic chart can be checked (see above pictures).
A calculation of spherical trigonometry, mathematical and precise, gives a distance close to 2.9439071 Nm. The maximum accuracy error of the values given by the BEA is 5 thousandths of degree (approximately 0.3 Nm), one way or the other.
In other words: at 2:10, Flight AF 447 is not on the planned route of the flight plan, as said by the BEA, but almost 3Nm west of it.
Between 2:00 and 2:10, around the ORARO region “where the Lufthansa flight deviated from 10Nm to the west», AF447 could also have changed its track westerly of the planned route. In 10 minutes, at a Mach speed of about 0.80, the deviation was even able to easily reach 10Nm to the west and still allow AF447 to return on track at TASIL.
At 2:10 UTC, 3 Nm to the west of its flight plan route, AF447 may be returning from an west deviation – as Lufthansa did before him in the same “region” – and then face the first failure : the Pitot probes.
Today, thanks to satellite navigation, everyone understands that a difference of 3 miles (about 6 km) can not be due to a navigation error. This can not be, either, a voluntary “offset” : enroute “offset” is always right of track – in accordance with the SLOP requirements (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure). In this case, a SLOP would have resulted in one mile variation east of AF447 flight plan route, and not 3 miles to the west …
No, this variation of 3 miles west can only come from action by the crew that flew the plane west of the flight plan route, as did Lufthansa in the same area, and this happened before the probes problems raised.
Simply observe from the cockpit planes crossing each others on airways, including over the Atlantic, to realize the accuracy of navigation is such that the planes intersect exactly one above the other. Three miles west can’t be a navigation error…
Whatever say the BEA and Mr Gourgeon, the crew was not incompetent to the point of failing to use the radar. As confirmed page 61 of the BEA report, the crew had even taken actions to follow the weather during the flight by asking many possible diversion airports (San Salvador and Sal, Amilcar) and others ETOPS diversion airports.
While the last position of the aircraft is 3 Nm west of the flight plan route, and while positions reports are separated by 10 minutes, how can the BEA write that until 2:10 “the flight remained on the flight planned route” ?
Is this really true and accurate ? Is this factual ?
Presenting as a fact the Lufthansa deviation 10 miles west, and hiding away AF447 deviation 3 miles west will not make us believe the crew was stupid enough to fly straight into “the big gigantic storm”.
publié le 2009-07-11 22:51 par EuroCockpit.
© EuroCockpit (transcrito do site http://www.eurocockpit.com)